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ON LIBERTY-AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW
NEIL K. KOMESAR*
The authors take on the difficult task of examining lib-
erty as a fundamental constitutional value.'
Professor Terrell's paper constructs a broad-based defini-
tion of liberty as meaningful choice. At least ostensibly the
intellectual purpose is descriptive - what is meant by liberty
(rather than what should liberty mean). This description is
achieved by examining the conundrums posed by philoso-
phers who have attempted to define liberty? It is thus less
what "we" (as a society) mean by liberty as what "they" (phi-
losophers) mean by liberty. But since philosophers are mem-
bers of society who are particularly interested in discussing
and defining fundamental values like liberty, a concept
evolved from their discussions might be considered as a
rough approximation of the range of societal views on
liberty.
Professor Butler's paper examines the jury as an actor in
the protection of liberty. Here the intellectual purpose is nor-
mative - should the jury be given a greater role in the pro-
tection of liberty. The author concludes that the jury was
meant to and should have a far more pervasive role in our
constitutional order.
Terrell's paper treats liberty without any attachment to
institutional consideration. As defined, liberty could be a fun-
damental value in awide (almost infinite) range of constitu-
tional configurations. In this setting, I find it difficult to dis-
tinguish liberty as a fundamental constitutional value from
liberty as a fundamental societal or personal value. What we
have is a broad, interesting but institutionalness definition.of
a value or goal. I am troubled by the lack of connection be-
tween this goal and its conceived constitutional manifesta-
tions - rights and powers. That is, I am uncertain of the
connection between the definition of liberty and constitu-
tional theory.
By contrast, Butler's work is deeply concerned with the
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
1. This comment, like the others, is largely based on earlier editions
of the principal papers which were presented at the symposium on liberty
referred to in the Director's Note supra at vi.
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protection of liberty by a right to broad-based jury trials. By
basing the analysis on a concern for the mode of protection
of liberty, we can see the connection between a goal and a
proposed configuration of decision-making aimed at reaching
that goal. The historical treatment shows that it was not so
much what was meant by liberty in the abstract but the per-
ceived dangers to liberty and the perceived modes of its pro-
tection which formed the view on liberty at any point in time
and over time.
But what Professor Butler's paper gains in analytical
depth it loses in intellectual tone and coverage. Liberty, as
employed here, seems narrower in potential than the mean-
ing given that value by Terrell. There is nothing wrong with
a narrowed definition per se. But here it is accompanied by
strong normative conclusions which would seem to require
justification in terms of a broad-based notion of societal
goals. However, even if one were to identify the notion of
liberty employed by Butler and accept it as paramount, there
are reasons to doubt that the limited institutional analysis em-
ployed is sufficient to support the sweeping conclusions the
author proposes.
The features of both Terrell's and Butler's papers which
trouble me most are features shared in substantial part by
most intellectual approaches to the Constitution. It is com-
mon to analyze the Constitution by focusing exclusively on
the definition of fundamental values in the abstract. The de-
bates then concern whose conception of fundamental values
is best. As I have recently argued at length elsewhere, such
analysis is basically incomplete.2 We will know very little
about the formation and evolution of constitutions - de-
scriptively or prescriptively - from such analyses. I have ar-
gued (and will argue here) that constitutional concepts can be
understood only when institutions and institutional compari-
2. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously - Introduction to A Strategy
for Constitution Analysis, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 366 (1984). (Hereinafter,
Komesar, "Constitutional Analysis"). This work reflects the comparative
institutional approach to legal analysis I presented in Komesar, In Search of
a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981) and applied to landlord-tenant law in a com-
mentary paper in a previous Law and Economics Center Conference,
Komesar, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: A Comparative Institutional
View, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1984).
A commentary paper such as this will not allow for an extensive recapitu-
lation of the points made in this work, but I believe it accurately reflects
the view presented there. I will note points at which arguments presented
here are filled out in the longer work.
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son play a central and essential analytical role. In this sense,
the problems I find here are not unique to our principal au-
thors. In fact, the openness and care to reflect a range of per-
ceptions of values, without the desire to link any single per-
ception to a given constitutional outcome, makes the
treatment praiseworthy.
In turn, when institutional features are considered, it is
common to find sweeping conclusions based on a limited set
of institutional attributes. These treatments commonly lack
adequate comparison or perception of the range of variation
in outcome, which is usually associated with variation in the
range of substantive societal issues involved. These are the
problems I find with Professor Butler's paper. Again his
treatment is better than most. The author considers an insti-
tution no longer in vogue and asks important and interesting
questions about attributes not usually considered. Although
too much is concluded from too little institutional analysis,
there are some interesting issues raised and insights provided.
I propose to discuss the features of each paper in greater
depth in the two sections which follow.
I. LIBERTY, INSTITUTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The basic feature of Professor Terrell's definition of lib-
erty is choice. Liberty is encroached" upon when meaningful,
rational choice is diminished by the direct and deliberate ac-
tion of human actors. It appears to me that one of the au-
thor's major contributions here is the notion of a core of
choice. Liberty is not related to all choice; it is linked to suffi-
cient choice - a set of choices which is meaningful. In turn,
Terrell employs degrees of diminution in this core of choice
to aid him in resolving some of the philosophical disputes
about such subjects as the meaning of harm (liberty versus
license) or the meaning of non-human (or non-deliberate and
non-direct) constraints. These attempts to make otherwise ex-
ogenous features endogenous to the analysis is worthy of
respect.
Frankly, I am unsure whether the definitional features
chosen by Professor Terrell best represent the meaning we
give to the term liberty even as a general societal value. The
concept of "non-human constraints," whose role and defini-
tion has altered between drafts of the principal paper, re-
mains problematic. The degree to which collective action ex-
pands or constricts choice and the associated degree to which
citizens perceive these choices as influencing their liberty
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seems inadequately captured by terms like "direct" and "de-
liberate." This seems especially so in a definition of liberty
prompted by expansion or alterations in notions of property,
specifically - the "new property." References to tort con-
cepts like causality and foreseeability only underline the
weakness of this link in the definition of liberty. These are
concepts which are not only ill-defined in tort law but also
often used as conduits for other quite different considera-
tions. It is unclear to me whether the author believes that
"directness" or "deliberateness" are to be truncated into the
notion of degree of diminution of choice or are to remain
separate. If they are to be truncated, then, why raise them as
separate? If they are to remain separate, they require either
more careful definition or a recognition that a major gap ex-
ists in the theory.
But I am less concerned with the internal features of the
definition of liberty than I am with how it would be used to
understand our Constitution and its theory, history and anal-
ysis. Here we come to the connection between liberty and
rights or liberty and powers. If liberty is choice, then a con-
stitutional system fundamentally concerned with liberty is, in
turn, fundamentally concerned with protection of choice or
protection of liberty.
On a general level, the Constitution is replete with exam-
ples of attempts to protect choice as it is defined by Terrell.
For example, Article I, section 8 empowers Congress to regu-
late commerce, carry on war, deter piracy, and so on. These
"enumerated powers" were augmented, by implication, by
the police power lodged in state governments. In general,
these provisions of the Constitution provided the basis for
protection of the individual from potentially severe reduc-
tions in choice caused by other individuals (or other nations).
The Constitution also contains many provisions such as
Article I, sections 9 and 10 and many of the Amendments to
the Constitution which restrict the activities of the national
and state legislatures. Choice is thus protected from the activ-
ities of other individuals operating as collective entities or
under the guise of collective entities.
Still other Constitutional provisions can be seen as pro-
tecting choice indirectly, but importantly, by defining the
characteristics of such governmental entities as Congress, the
Executive and the Judiciary. The famed system of checks and
balances can be seen as protecting choice structurally. As
time and interpretation have altered, expanded or perfected
(I leave the choice to the reader) the Constitution's various
[Vol. I
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forms of protection of choice, varying entities, namely Con-
gress, the Executive, the courts, and/or the states-have
played varying roles in the process of protection.
Thus, the author is clearly correct when he supposes that
the protection of choice, understood as core choice or non-
harmful human, can be seen in the terms, intent and evolu-
tion of the Constitution. He is, in fact, too correct. Liberty is
protected, and therefore one can observe it as a constitu-
tional value, in quite different constitutional provisions. It is
there potentially when power and discretion are granted to
any governmental entity or to government as a whole and it
is there when this power is constrained either by provisions
which strictly prohibit government action or by provisions
which allocate responsibility to the judiciary to control gov-
ernment action.
Whether, as a matter of description, liberty is a funda-
mental value depends on the perceived operation of this com-
plex of institutional features. I do not know how one would
know a priori that restricting governmental choice on issues
of speech or bills of attainder provides more or less protec-
tion to meaningful choice than the broad grant of govern-
ment power to decide whether or to what extent individual
actions, in the marketplace or the battlefield, can be re-
stricted or constrained.
To the author, liberty is protected most strongly (as a
matter of description) by the death penalty for murder. But is
even that obviously true? A set of choices are protected, but
the accompanying governmental power to define murder,
prescribe its manner of individual determination and the use
of the death penalty, may also provide dangers to meaningful
choices. The degree of these potential dangers depends on
institutional realities. That is, they depend on the potential
for danger from individuals (murderers) associated with no or
lesser constraints from the state versus the potential for error
or bias in the governmental decisions.
As I have suggested elsewhere, abstract definitions of
fundamental values (liberty, equality, privacy) tell us little
about the Constitution without concern for the institutional
arrangements employed to implement these broad values.'
Put more directly, in terms of the concept of choice, the basic
issue is not whether the Constitution can be seen as con-
3. Komesar, Constitutional Analysis, supra note 2, especially in the
context of the consideration of the fundamental value position of Laurence
Tribe.
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cerned with the protection of choice - and, therefore, rights
to choice. The basic issue is the protection of which choices
from which sources of danger by which entities - in other
words, the protection of whom from whom by whom.
Take "freedom of speech" which the author employs as
a central example of liberty - even absolute liberty - in
our constitutional scheme. To the author, the dynamics of
this freedom can be understood by observing variation in the
degree of the constraint on speech. We are told that an at-
tempt to remove all speech choices is absolutely prohibited
while lesser constraints (the loss of lesser options) is less pro-
hibited. While this observation seems valid, how much of the
picture of the protection of speech choices do we have? Do
we know why speech choices are considered central examples
of liberty while other choices such as those involving one's
form of employment or the use of one's land appear to take
far different forms - and, incidentally, are commonly con-
sidered less protected liberties? Do we even understand the
range of constitutional protection of speech choices? Is even
the variation observed by the author well captured by varia-
tion in choice?
It would seem that there are many potential sources of
danger to choices about speech. Even within the notion of
choice employed by the authors, there is clearly a danger as-
sociated with the action of private individuals. Someone op-
posed to my message may threaten me with severe physical
harm or boycott my products or convince others to do so. I
may be out of a job, in the hospital, or without a home
should I speak. These are presumably sources of danger to
my speech choices emanating from the direct and deliberate
action of individuals operating as individuals. If these choices
are important to me, I would like to have them protected and
one potentially valuable source of protection is government
or collective action.
But then I will worry about the protector, the govern-
ment. Although I may need a Congress to protect my speech
choices, I also need protection of those choices from Con-
gress. After all, individuals who wish to suppress me can op-
erate in the political arena as well as in the private sector.
Now presumably the source of protection is the courts as in-
terpreters and implementers of the Constitution.
Speech choices are a form of protected activity in the
Constitution. While it is said that speech is a fundamental
value in our Constitution, I doubt that this means that speech
choices are necessarily more important than other choices. It
[Vol. I
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may only mean that speech choices need greater protection
from the public sector and can receive that protection at per-
missible costs from the judiciary.
Is it that speech choices are less likely to be examples of
license - acts which, by the author's definition, harm the lib-
erty of others? I do not dismiss this assertion out of hand. By
degree perhaps there is less chance of harm. Nevertheless
there still remains potential for harm and, in some contexts,
significant potential for harm.
Apparently, the Framers of the Constitution may have
had a different and narrower perception of the coverage of
the First Amendment than is now given it.4 Does this necessa-
rily mean that the Framers valued expression and speech less
than we now value it? Perhaps, but not necessarily. Any
thoughtful contemporary supporter of freedom of speech
and press must recognize that given the significant role of the
media in forming opinions, there is a potential for harm to
others even from protected speech activities. When faced
with this potential for harm to individual choice, opting for a
lesser constraint on governmental control of speech activity
may be as consistent with the protection of liberty as a
broader constraint. Depending on one's perception of the
relative dangers associated with public choice in this area, dif-
ferent constitutional configurations may manifest the same
taste for liberty generally or in the narrower context of
speech and expression.
As a matter of description, speech today is treated differ-
ently than most other sources of individual choice in that de-
cisions regarding the degree of harm and the protection
against harm are made more by the judiciary and less by the
legislature. As a constitutional matter, it is the form of pro-
tection and the fear of erstwhile protectors which provides
the dynamic of speech as a fundamental value. I would sug-
gest that it is the distrust of the political process as an arbiter
of license and liberty - of valid choice and invalid choice -
which explains the recognition of speech as a prime
"freedom."
As a general matter, the Constitution reveals a rich array
of protections of choice in which sometimes the perceived
source of protection is the legislature and at other times the
perceived source of danger is the legislature. By the author's
definition both the power and the limits of the legislature are
examples of liberty. Within their definition are important de-
4. See LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1964).
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cision points: What is harm? What are basic decision options?
When is the individual rational? When are non-human con-
straints really human? A basic issue of constitutional law and
theory is missed if only these questions are highlighted. A
more basic question is who will decide these other questions.
A person in the state of nature or under the veil of igno-
rance or in any hypothetical neutral state would hardly be in
a position to choose a constitutional form even if he or she
could identify a workable definition of rationality, a core of
meaningful choices, the difference between license and lib-
erty and the difference between human and non-human con-
straint. One would need to know about the mechanisms for
choice and implementations as well as the sources of danger
from these mechanisms.
A peaceful state of nature might never be left, a benevo-
lent dictator might be attractive, rule by a trustworthy simple
majority might be acceptable, or close control by an oligar-
chic judiciary might be attractive, all depending not on goals
and ideal choices but on the perception of the relative merits
of these institutions. These relative merits may vary across
areas or subjects of choice, such that optimal protection of
choice in one area is assured through domination by the leg-
islature empowered by open-ended discretion while in an-
other area certain choices are specifically, and in detailed lan-
guage, excluded from public choice altogether. Or, in turn,
discretion is granted to the legislature subject to control by a
court empowered by its own broadly defined mandate. One
can see all these forms in our Constitution. All can be consis-
tent with a desire to protect meaningful choice. Whether
they are consistent with such protection or with other goals
or with failure of any of these goals depends not just on the
definition of liberty in the abstract, but on a consideration of
the characteristics of the institutional forms' chosen.
Those who wrote and ratified the original Constitution
and its Bill of Rights were aware of the central importance of
institutional choice. They were also aware of its difficult and
tenuous nature. They had lived through enough significant
changes in the perception of the correct institutional config-
uration to enable them to associate these with their desires
for liberty (or other goals). Where once distrust of the Execu-
tive had dominated with an associated affection for the legis-
lature, by 1789 distrust of both accompanied a search for a
mixture of institutions which would serve their ends. The
role of the judiciary was uncertain. Even at a time when one
would imagine more homogeneous perceptions of liberty
IVol. I
AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW
than at present, there were a wide variety of perceptions on
which configurations of power and constraint would serve
this goal.
5
What is meant by liberty at any point in time or over
time seems significantly dependent on the perceived qualities
of alternative institutional configurations. It seems an open
question whether it is perception of meaningful choice which
determines institutional choice or the opposite. It has been
common to suggest that what we choose to call fundamental
values determines institutional and constitutional choice (e.g.,
fundamental rights trigger strict security and therefore con-
straints on collective choice). However, it may be as likely
that institutional choices determine what we call fundamental
values (e.g., strict scrutiny and the perceived implications of
institutional choice determine what we call "fundamental
rights"). At the very least, anyone interested in understand-
ing liberty in our time or at any time ("new" or "old" liberty)
is running severe risks if that inquiry does not include exten-
sive and serious comparative institutional inquiry.
II. LIBERTY AND THE JURY.
In an era when it has become common to bemoan the
Seventh Amendment and the impediment caused by juries in
ever more complex litigation, it is interesting and indeed re-
freshing to see the jury discussed in affirmative terms and its
relative benefits considered. Professor Butler's discussion of
the jury provides useful insight into both the intentions and
the sophistication of the Framers. For one interested in the
role of the comparison of institutions in the evolution of the
Constitution, there is much grist for the mill. In addition,
anyone familiar with the evolution of doctrine under the tak-
ings clause must be sympathetic to the descriptions of judicial
awkwardness and the strained definitions of property and tak-
ing. It is quite clear that whatever the hopes of the Framers,
not much protection of individual choice from governmental
actors will be found today in the takings or contracts clauses.
But there are several aspects of Butler's-paper which I
would like to question. Throughout the discussion of the
jury, a "libertarian" perspective is ostensibly employed. This
term plus virtually all the examples leads me to believe that
5. For a valuable description of the institutional environment and
evolution between the Revolution and the Constitution, see WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
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liberty here is defined as individual choices (rational, mean-
ingful, etc.) protected from harmful (deliberate and direct)
collective or governmental action. It is not liberty as individ-
ual choice protected from other individuals. This is a com-
mon enough usage and was reflected in many of the exam-
ples employed by Professor Terrell. However, this usage does
not follow either from the definition of liberty nor from the
broad definition of rights in service of liberty employed by
Terrell. Recall that Terrell's core example in the first part
was the death penalty for murder, which is plainly an exam-
ple of protection by the government of the individual from
other individuals.
If protection of liberty includes protection of individual
choice from the harmful action of other individuals, then
Butler's subject is not liberty as a constitutional value, but is a
subset of liberty as a constitutional value. The police power
considered at odds with liberty by Butler would seem a con-
stitutional feature consistent with liberty in Terrell's
terminology.
Professor Butler finds a broad role for the jury as a de-
terminer of fact and law or as a determiner of the equity of
the law in application. Most examples of the constitutional
role of the jury he provides involve the takings clause. The
author suggests that had the jury continued to play the role
intended for it, the takings clause would have more vitality,
liberty would be better protected and fairness would prevail.
It should be noted that fairness and equity are aspects of lib-
erty which need not have flowed directly from the definition
of liberty in the first section. But even including them here,
would the increased role (re-instatement) of the jury increase
liberty, fairness and equity?
As I understand the argument, liberty is increased be-
cause juries unlike judges would not be so constrained in
their willingness to force the state to compensate in situations
in which the state had initially chosen not to do so. In fact,
given the "ratchet" effect he suggests, we would expect
greater compensation because both the courts and the jury
would have their crack at the state. If the judge found a com-
pensable event, then there would be compensation. If the
judge did not find such an event, the jury still could.
But we are supposing that increasing compensable events
will add to liberty. Why is this so? Suppose that the state were
protecting my liberty by stopping someone from running a
cement plant in my area and it did so via a zoning law. Under
the takings clause with the re-instated jury, the jury may find
[Vol. I
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that the particular application to a zoned parcel lowered its
value and the expectations of its owner and, therefore,
should be compensated. Would a state now confronted with
the increased risk that juries would require compensation be
as willing to protect me through an eminent domain law as
through a zoning law? Suppose the answer were no, would
this be a decrease in my liberty? Would it be an increase in
net liberty? Would it constitute greater fairness and equity
plus (or therefore) greater liberty?
It may be that it would not decrease my liberty if the
state refused to act because the action of my neighbor would
not truly deplete my core of meaningful choices. Under these
circumstances, when the state is stopped from restricting my
neighbor's use of land, liberty is increased: harm to his set of
meaningful choices is constrained. Indeed my request that
the constraint be obtained even if the state has to compensate
may be an instance in which I am requesting that my choices
be increased by altering a non-human (or non-direct or non-
deliberate) constraint. Therefore, liberty as defined in Ter-
rell's paper would not be increased even by a result reached
via compensation. It might be better that no constraint on
land use be achieved. Thus, even if the state chooses not to
act given the requirement to compensate, no liberty may be
lost and perhaps some gained.
But all this seems dependent on a series of assumptions
about various aspects of liberty. Who will make these deci-
sions? It seems to me that the question comes down to who is
the best determiner of meaningful choice, harmful acts and
non-human constraints (as well perhaps as equity, fairness
and equality in the form of isonomia). Why is the best deter-
miner the jury rather than the legislature?
The author argues that judges with their greater expo-
sure to public pressure, more formalistic nature and lack of
basic connection to the populace are inferior to juries. But,
even if this is true, why is it obvious that juries are superior
to the legislature? If there are reasons to doubt the perfec-
tion of the legislature (and there surely are), are these rea-
sons constant across all forms of taking (especially given the
broad range of legislation which would now be subject to an
expanded takings clause)? The author is clearly calling for
more compensation, i.e. more compensable events. To the
extent that this means less government action under the po-
lice power, it is important to know who is the best definer of
liberty as between the jury and the legislature as well as be-
tween jury and judge.
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The author's institutional arguments are of the "parade
of horribles" variety. He recounts graphically the strange
meanderings of takings clause doctrine and the disaster of
the Lochner era. (He could in turn show the bumbling, cor-
rupt, and anti-individual potential of the majoritarian legisla-
ture.) The basic question asked is familiar: Could things be
worse?
But the answer is hardly a straightforward yes. All insti-
tutions are highly imperfect including the jury. It is not a pri-
ori clear that even the Lochner era was worse than the takings
clause approach proposed by the author. I cannot assert that
it would be worse. But the argument presented is not suffi-
cient to carry the strongly worded and certain conclusions it
accompanies.
Elsewhere I have discussed the Lochner era as a period of
choices between highly imperfect decision-makers.6 I am
hardly a great believer in broad-based judicial determination
in this area. But the choice between legislative and judicial
decision-makers is hardly as simple or straightforward as is
commonly assumed. The addition of a jury-dominated mode
of review is hardly likely to resolve the institutional compari-
son in any more sweeping fashion.
The takings clause and the contracts clause represented a
concern that the majoritarian process ruled perhaps by the
unpropertied or less propertied majority would fail to suffi-
ciently consider and protect the propertied minorities. The
Framers had seen examples of what they believed was such
behavior. Tyranny of the majority is a serious institutional
theme in the Constitution. But would or should the role of
the clause change if, as the nation and the process itself be-
came larger and more complex, the political process was not
as subject to this majoritarian bias and was in fact more sub-
ject to a bias favoring concentrated and organized minorities
capable of lobbying and bribing with greater efficacy? I do
not assert this change as reality. But there are good grounds
to consider it as a plausible hypothesis.7 If it were shown true,
should we turn to different forms of constraint on different
aspects of governmental decision? Would the jury as arbiter
of equity be more or less useful in a changing institutional
scheme?
Litigation to trigger this jury-augmented takings clause
6. Komesar, Constitutional Analysis, supra note 2, in the discussion of




has its own institutional dynamic. The cost configuration of
litigation would indicate that it would be most used by those
with larger per capita losses. Thus, if a governmental deci-
sion harmed the "property" of one person extensively, it
would be more likely to be reviewed in this takings litigation
than if it harmed a larger minority collectively as much, or
more, but in a lower amount per capita. Whether this is a
greater or lesser protection of liberty relative to a less con-
strained legislature depends on a comparison of imperfect
institutions.8
When the argument for a constitutional jury is carried
beyond the takings clause, its power seems even more ques-
tionable. At the close of Butler's paper we are told of the
recent innovation in protection of liberty in the free speech
area via the increased role of the jury in obscenity cases. The
author makes it sound as though this is a step forward in the
protection of individual choice from government
encroachment.
This seems to me to put a particularly bright tone to
Miller v. California.9 It is quite true that the Court has exhib-
ited great ineptness in the obscenity area and has tended, as
it often does when it cannot easily deal with substantive is-
sues, to defer to the legislature. But I doubt that publishers
and movie makers feel that their choices have been better
protected under the Miller doctrine with its recourse to varia-
ble local standards imposed by juries.
Perhaps, however, Professor Butler would be within his
rights to insist that the issue is not institutional comparison in
the abstract but rather the institutional choice of the Framers
who placed significant faith in the jury. (Although, if that is
so, he would have to drop his own general arguments about
comparative institutional competency.) If we, in later genera-
tions, disagree, we should amend the Constitution rather
than distort it by judicial and legislative fiat. Here I am at a
disadvantage. I have not studied the historical record about
the jury with the impressive detail revealed in the paper. Yet
when one looks at the historical background and the early
cases it becomes clear that the Framers were both pragmatic
and aware that underlying institutional assumptions might
change. As time passes and conflicts arise between the Fram-
8. For a more extensive discussion of this choice in the property law
context, see Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A
Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 supra note 2, at 70.
9. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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ers' reasons for an institutional choice and the actual work-
ings of that institutional choice, to which manifestation of in-
tent should constitutional interpreters be true?'0
CONCLUSION
Professors Terrell and Butler have taken on a difficult
task and their effort has produced an interesting attempt to
define liberty and a provocative proposal for constitutional
reform. Both papers contain summaries of relevant litera-
tures and make us think about familiar topics in different
ways. I liked the open tone and broad framework of Terrell's
analysis first part and the concern about institutional features
exhibited by Butler. By the same token, I would have liked
more institutional analysis by Professor Terrell and more
breadth and range in the analysis of institutions by Professor
Butler.
10. This theme is expanded in the discussion of the work of Raoul
Berger in Komesar, Constitutional Analysis, supra note 2.
[Vol. I
